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The Debate over Adequality
Adequality, or â (parisotes) in the original Greek of Diophantus 1 , is a crucial step in Fermat's method of ªnding maxima, minima, tangents, and solving other problems that a modern mathematician would solve using inªnitesimal calculus. The method is presented in a series of short articles in Fermat's collected works (1891, pp. 133-172) . The ªrst article, Methodus ad Disquirendam Maximam et Minimam 2 , opens with a summary of an algorithm for ªnding the maximum or minimum value of an algebraic expression in a variable A. For convenience, we will write such an expression in modern functional notation as f (a). 3
Summary of Fermat's Algorithm
The algorithm can be broken up into six steps in the following way:
1. Introduce an auxiliary symbol e, and form f (a ϩ e); 2. Set adequal the two expressions f (a ϩ e) ϭ AD f (a); 4 3. Cancel the common terms on the two sides of the adequality. The remaining terms all contain a factor of e; 4. Divide by e (see also next step); 5. In a parenthetical comment, Fermat adds: "or by the highest common factor of e"; 6. Among the remaining terms, suppress 5 all terms which still contain a factor of e. 6 Solving the resulting equation for a yields the extremum of f.
In modern mathematical language, the algorithm entails expanding the difference quotient
f a e f a e ( ) ( ) + − in powers of e and taking the constant term. 7 The method (leaving aside step (5) for the moment) is immediately understandable to a modern reader as the elementary calculus exercise of ªnding the extremum by solving the equation fЈ(a) ϭ 0. But the real question is how Fermat understood this algorithm in his own terms, in the mathematical language of his time, prior to the invention of calculus by Barrow, Leibniz, Newton, et al. There are two crucial points in trying to understand Fermat's reasoning: ªrst, the meaning of "adequality" in step (2), and second, the justiªcation for suppressing the terms involving positive powers of e in step (6). The two issues are closely related because interpretation of adequality depends on the conditions on e. One condition which Fermat always assumes is that e is positive. He did not use negative numbers in his calculations. Fermat introduces the term adequality in Methodus with a reference to Diophantus of Alexandria. In the third article of the series, Ad Eamdem Methodum (Sur la Même Méthode), he quotes Diophantus' Greek term â , which he translates following Xylander and Bachet, as adaequatio or adaequalitas (1896, p. 126; see A. Weil 1984, p. 28 The Greek word â consists of the prepositional preªx para and the root isotes, "equality." The preªx para, like all "regular" preªxes in Greek, also functions as a preposition indicating position; its basic meaning is that of proximity, but depending upon the construction in which it appears, it can indicate location ("beside"), direction ("to"), or source ("from") (see Luraghi 2003, pp. 20-22, 131-145) .
Compounds with all three meanings are found. Most familiar to mathematicians will be parallelos ( © ), used of lines that are "next to" one another; the Greek for "nearly resembling" is paraplesios ( sage other than those of Diophantus in which a term involving para and isos refers to mathematical equality, whether approximate or otherwise. Diophantus himself used the term parisos to describe terms that are approximately equal, as we shall demonstrate below (Subsection 8.1).
The term isotes denotes a relationship ("equality"), not an action ("setting equal"); the normal term for the action of equalizing would be a form in -osis, and in fact the words isosis (Ñ ) and parisosis ( É ) are attested with the meaning "making equal" or "equalization"; the latter is a common term in rhetoric for using the same (or nearly the same) number of words or syllables in parallel clauses. The word â , which occurs only in the two Diophantus passages, is on the face of it more appropriate to the meaning "near equality. " Fermat himself may not have gotten this far into Greek etymology. On the other hand, Fermat viewed Diophantus through the lens of Bachet's analysis. Bachet does interpret it as approximate equality. If Fermat follows Bachet, seeking to interpret Fermat's method of adequality/ â on the basis of the Latin term adaequare misses the point (see Subsection 7.1).
Modern Interpretations
There are differing interpretations of Fermat's method in the literature. A. Weil notes that Diophantus uses the Greek term to designate his way of approximating a given number by a rational solution to a given problem. (cf. e.g. Dioph.V.11 and 14; Weil 1984, p. 28) According to Weil's interpretation, approximation is implicit in the meaning of the original Greek term. H. Breger rejects Weil's interpretation of Diophantus, and proposes his own interpretation of the mathematics of Diophantus' â . He argues that â means equality to Diophantus (Breger 1994, p. 201) . Thus, the question of whether there is an element of approximation in the Greek source of the term is itself subject to dispute. There is also a purely algebraic aspect to adequality, based on the ideas of Pappus of Alexandria, and Fermat's predecessor Viète. In Sur la Même Méthode following the comment quoted above, Fermat writes as follows:
En cet endroit, Pappus appelle un rapport minimum xã Ê Ã ©x (singulier et minimum), parce que, si l'on propose une question sur les grandeurs données, et qu'elle soit en général satisfaite par deux points, pour les valeurs maximum et minimum, il n'y aura qu'un point qui satisfasse. C'est pour cela que Pappus appelle minimum et singulier (c'est-à-dire unique) le plus petit rapport de tous ceux qui peuvent être proposés dans la question. (Fermat 1896, p. 127) The point is that the extremum of a quadratic expression at the point a corresponds to a double root in e for what would be in modern terms the equation f (a ϩ e) Ϫ f (a) ϭ 0. From this point of view, Fermat explains his method in terms of roots of algebraic equations. In the ªrst paragraph of the fourth article in the series, Methodus de Maxima et Minima (Méthode du Maximum et Minimum), Fermat reveals the source of this procedure:
En étudiant la méthode de la syncrise et de la anastrophe de Viète, et en poursuivant soigneusement son application à la recherche de la constitution des équations corrélatives, il m'est venu à l'esprit d'en dériver un procédé pour trouver le maximum et le minimum et pour résoudre ainsi aisément toutes les difªcultés relatives aux conditions limites, qui ont causé tant d'embarras aux géomètres anciens et modernes. (Fermat 1896, p. 131) From this point of view, adequality is based on replacing the variable a by the variable a ϩ e in the original algebraic expression and thus creating an equation in a and e which is required to have a double root at e ϭ 0 for an extremal point a. This interpretation is considered by Breger (1994) and K. Barner (2011) to cover all the examples. They deny that any kind of "approximation" is involved, and hold adequality to be a formal or algebraic procedure of "setting equal." 1.4. Wieleitner, Strømholm, and Giusti The authors H. Wieleitner (1929) , P. Strømholm (1968) , and E. Giusti (2009) argue that both interpretations, algebraic and approximation, are valid, representing different stages in the development of Fermat's method. The algebraic approach, following Pappus and Viète, involves equating two values f (a) and f (a ϩ e), below the maximum or above the minimum. 8 However, there is another point of view in which f (a) and f (a ϩ e) are deªnitely not assumed by Fermat to be equal, as he writes in Sur la Même Méthode that he compares the two expressions "comme s'ils étaient égaux, quoiqu'en fait ils ne le soient point" (Fermat 1896, p. 126) , and a little later "une comparaison feinte ou une adégalité" (p. 127). Giusti (2009) and Strømholm (1968) consider this to represent a second stage in the development of Fermat's method. Similarly, in the fourth article, which begins with a reference to Viète and emphasizes the algebraic ap-proach, Fermat introduces an element of approximation, remarking that the difference between the two points a and e goes to zero 9 :
Plus le produit des segments augmentera, plus au contraire diminuera la différence entre a et e, jusqu'à ce qu'elle s'évanouisse tout à fait. (1896, p. 132) What complicates the task is that Fermat does not separate clearly between these two methods. They appear in successive paragraphs. Mahoney understands one of the meanings of adequality as "approximate equality" or "equality in the limiting case" (Mahoney 1973, p. 164 n.46) , while emphasizing that the term has multiple meanings. Fermat never gave a full explanation of his method, but he derived it from three sources: Diophantus, Pappus, and Fermat's predecessor Viète (Vieta). If we consider the source in Diophantus and interpret adequality as approximate equality as did Weil, Strømholm, and Giusti, it is natural to ask whether Fermat considered e to be arbitrarily small and eventually negligible, although he never explicitly stated such an assumption. On the other hand, the algebraic point of view, ªnding a condition for a unique root of multiplicity 2, following Pappus and Viète, is clearly the point of view in a number of examples mentioned above. These considerations do not resolve the issue of what Fermat thought about the actual magnitude of e. Strømholm (1968) and Wieleitner (1929) deal with this question. They distinguish two methods in Fermat. One method is algebraic, following Pappus and Viète, which Strømholm following Wieleitner calls M2. The other method, M1, is interpreted as expanding f (a ϩ e) Ϫ f (a) in powers of e. The latter approach is most fully expounded in Fermat's letter to Brûlart (Fermat 1643) . The letter attempts to explain why the method guarantees a maximum or minimum without assuming a condition on the size of e. The "approximation" interpretation actually branches out into two distinct approaches. The difference between them concerns the interpretation of the symbol e that Fermat uses, to form expressions that in modern notation would be written as "f (x ϩ e) Ϫ f (x)." Namely, one can think of e as representing a kinetic process such as "tending to 0," as in the fourth article, as cited above, or one can think of e as "inªnitesimal." G. Cifoletti (1990) and J. Stillwell (2006) interpret it in accordance with the latter approach.
Three Approaches to the Nature of E
There are therefore at least three different approaches to Fermat's symbol E as it appears in adequalities: algorithmic or formal/algebraic; kinetic E → 0; and inªnitesimal. We will argue that the last one is closest to Fermat's thinking. We note that two distinct issues are sometimes conºated in the literature on Fermat's method. The ªrst issue is whether adequality means ( ) "setting equal," or whether it is ( ) an "approximate equality." A second, separate issue concerns the question of what the famous symbol E stands for: is it (A) an arbitrary variable, or does it imply (B) some notion of size: small, inªnitesimal, tending to zero, etc. The trend in the literature is that scholars following the interpretation ( ), also adopt (A), and similarly for the other pair. For instance, Breger (1994, p. 206 ) rejects the small/inªnitesimal idea and supports (A). But the thrust of his argument is to support the ( )-interpretation rather than the (A)-interpretation. These are, in fact, separate issues, as can be seen most readily in the context of an inªnitesimal-enriched ring such as the dual numbers D of the form a ϩ b where 2 ϭ 0. To differentiate a polynomial p(x), we apply the following purely algebraic procedure: expand in powers of ; write p(x ϩ ) ϭ p(x) ϩ q(x), where q(x) has no terms, then one has p(x ϩ ) Ϫ p(x) ϭ q(x), and q(x) is the derivative. This produces the derivative of p over D. A similar procedure works over any other reasonable inªnitesimal-enriched extension of ‫ޒ‬ such as the hyperreals (see footnote 33). The algebraic nature of this procedure in no way contradicts the inªnitesimal nature of . In addition to arguing that "adequality" is a purely algebraic procedure of "setting equal," Breger believes that E is a formal variable with no assumption on size. However, one does not necessarily imply the other. The procedures in non-standard analysis are purely algebraic and can be programmed by a ªnite algorithm (no need for an inªnite limiting process), yet here E is deªnitely inªnitesimal. No analysis of Fermat's method can be considered complete that does not include a discussion of the application to transcendental curves. Such an analysis appears in Section 5. Concerning the question as to whether Fermat's method is a purely algorithmic/algebraic one, with E being a formal variable, or whether it involves some notion of "smallness" on the part of E, we argue that the answer depends on which stage of Fermat's method one is dealing with. He certainly did present an algorithmic outline of his method in a way that suggests that E is a formal variable. However, when one examines other applications of the method, one notices additional aspects of Fermat's method which cannot be accounted for by means of a "formal" story. Thus, Fermat exploits his adequality to solve a least time variational problem for the refraction of light (see Section 9). Here E corresponds to a variation of a physical quantity, and it would seem paradoxical to describe it as a formal variable in this context. Furthermore, in the case of the cycloid, the transcendental nature of the problem creates a situation that cannot be treated algebraically at all (see Section 5). Once it is accepted that at least in some applications, the aspect of "smallness" on the part of E is indispensable, one can ask in what sense precisely is E "small." Today we know of two main approaches to "smallness," namely, (1) by means of kinetic ideas related to limits, or (2) by means of inªnitesimals. The former ideas were as yet undeveloped in Fermat's time (though they are already present in Newton only a few decades later), and in fact one ªnds very little "tends to . . ." material in Fermat. Meanwhile, inªnitesimals were already widely used by Kepler, Wallis, and others. Fermat's 1657 letter to Digby on Wallis's method (see Section 2) shows that he was intimately familiar with the method of indivisibles. What we argue therefore is that it is more reasonable to assume (2). The question why Fermat wasn't more explicit about the nature of his E is an interesting one. Note that Fermat was involved in an acrimonious rivalry with Descartes. Descartes thought that one of the strengths of his own method was that it was purely algebraic. It is possible that Fermat did not wish to elaborate on the meaning of E because he wished to avoid criticism by Descartes.
Methodological Issues in 17th Century Historiography
On 15 August 1657, Fermat sent a letter to Kenelm Digby (1603-1665). The letter was titled "Remarques sur l'arithmétique des inªnis de S. J. Wallis." The letter contains a critique of Wallis's inªnitesimal method that reveals as much about Fermat's own position as about Wallis's method. As we will see, certain aspects of Wallis's method not criticized by Fermat are as interesting as the actual criticisms.
Fermat's Letter to Digby
The letter is cited by A. Malet (1996, p. 37, n. 48) . It is also mentioned by J. Stedall, who goes on to say that The [mathematical] details of the subsequent argument need not concern us here. (Stedall 2001, p. 12) We will be precisely interested in the mathematical, as well as the "metamathematical" issues involved. Fermat summarizes his objection to Wallis's method in the following terms:
Mais, de même qu'on ne pourroit pas avoir la raison de tous les diamètres pris ensemble des cercles qui composent le cône à ceux du cylindre circonscrit, si on n'avoit la quadrature du triangle; non plus que la raison des diamètres des cercles qui composent le conoïde parabolique à ceux qui font le cylindre circonscrit, si on n'avoit la quadrature de la parabole ; ainsi on ne pourra pas connoître la raison des diamètres de tous les cercles qui composent la sphère à ceux des cercles qui composent le cylindre circonscrit, si l'on n'a pas la quadrature du cercle. (Fermat 1912, p. 348) Fermat is making a remarkable claim to the effect that in order to ªnd the quadrature of the circle, Wallis is exploiting the quadrature of the circle itself. Fermat appears to be criticizing an alleged circularity in Wallis's reasoning. Apart from the issue of the potency of his critique, what is striking about it is the aspect of Wallis's method that Fermat is not criticizing. Namely, what emerges from Fermat's presentation is that Fermat is taking the inªnitesimal technique itself for granted. In the paragraph preceding the one cited above, Fermat talks about spheres and cylinders being composed of inªnite families of parallel circles as a routine matter: D'où il conclut que, puisqu'on a trouvé aussi la raison de la sphère au cylindre circonscrit, ou celle de l'inªnité des cercles parallèles, dont on peut concevoir que la sphère est composée, à pareille multitude de ceux qui se peuvent feindre au cylindre, on pourra aussi espérer de pouvoir découvrir la raison des ordonnées en la sphère ou au cercle à celles du cylindre ou quarré, savoir la raison des diamètres des cercles inªnis qui composent la sphêre aux diamètres des cercles du cylindre. Ce qui seroit avoir la quadrature du cercle. (Fermat 1657, pp. 347-348) Thus, it is not the inªnitesimal method itself that Fermat is criticizing, but rather the logic of Wallis's reasoning.
Huygens and Rolle
C. Huygens (1940) declared in 1667 at the French Academy of Sciences that Fermat's "e" was an inªnitely small quantity:
Or, en prenant e inªniment petite, la même équation donnera la valeur de EG lorsqu'elle est égale à EF . . . Ensuite on divise tous les termes par e et on détruit ceux qui, après cette division, contiennent encore cette lettre, puisqu'ils représentent des quantités inªniment petites par rapport à ceux qui ne renferment plus e. (Huygens 1940; Trompler & Noël 2003, p. 110) Huygens's interpretation is testimony to the enduring inºuence of Fermat's method of adequality already in the 17th century. Yet, Huygens may have been putting in Fermat's mouth words that did not emanate therefrom. 10 Similarly, Michel Rolle in 1703 claimed a connection between Fermat's a and e and Leibniz's dx and dy:
En 1684, Mr de Leibniz donna dans des journaux de Leipzig des exemples de la formule ordinaire des tangentes, et il imposa le nom d'égalité différentielle à cette formule [. . .] Mr de Leibniz n'entreprend point d'expliquer l'origine de ces formules dans ce projet, ni d'en donner la démonstration [. . .] Au lieu de l'a & de l'e, il prend dx & dy. (Rolle 1703, p. 6) Yet Rolle was an enemy of the calculus, and his identiªcation of e and dx may have been due to his eagerness to denigrate Leibniz. How are we to avoid this type of pitfall in analyzing Fermat's oeuvre? In discussing Fermat's mathematics, two traps are to be avoided:
1. Whiggish history, that is, "the study of the past with direct and perpetual reference to the present" (H. Butterªeld 1931, p. 11) . A convincing reading of Fermat must be solidly grounded in the 17th century and its ideas, rather than 19th or 20th centuries and their ideas. 2. One needs to consider the possibility that Fermat wasn't working with clear concepts that were destined to become those of the calculus.
We will discuss each of them separately in Subsections 2.3 and 2.4.
Whig History
As far as trap (1) is concerned, it was precisely the risk of tendentious rewriting of mathematical history that prompted Mancosu to observe that the literature on inªnity is replete with such 'Whig' history. Praise and blame are passed depending on whether or not an author might have anticipated Cantor and naturally this leads to a completely anachronistic reading of many of the medieval and later contributions. (Mancosu 2009, p. 626 [emphasis added])
Thus, Cauchy has been often presented anachronistically as a sort of proto-Weierstrass. Such a Cauchy-Weierstrass tale has been critically analyzed by Blaszczyk et al. (2013) , Borovik et al. (2010) , Bråting (2007) , and . Whiggish tendencies in Leibniz scholarship were analyzed by Katz & Sherry (2012) .To guard against this trap, we will eschew potential 19th and 20th century ramiªcations of Fermat's work, and focus entirely on its 17th century context. More speciªcally, we will examine a possible connection between Fermat's adequality and Leibniz's Tran- The title of Leibniz's 1710 text is Symbolismus memorabilis calculi algebraici et inªnitesimalis in comparatione potentiarum et differentiarum, et de lege homogeneorum transcendentali. The inclusion of the transcendental law of homogeneity (lex homogeneorum transcendentalis) in the title of the text attests to the importance Leibniz attached to this law. The "equality up to an inªnitesimal" implied in TLH was explicitly discussed by Leibniz in a 1695 response to Nieuwentijt, in the following terms:
Caeterum aequalia esse puto, non tantum quorum differentia est omnino nulla, sed et quorum differentia est incomparabiliter parva; et licet ea Nihil omnino dici non debeat, non tamen est quantitas comparabilis cum ipsis, quorum est differentia. (Leibniz 1846 (Leibniz [1695 , p. 322 [emphasis added]) Translation:
Besides, I consider to be equal not only those things whose difference is entirely nothing, but also those whose difference is incomparably small: and granted that it [i.e., the difference] should not be called entirely Nothing, nevertheless it is not a quantity comparable to those whose difference it is.
How did Leibniz use the TLH in developing the calculus? The issue can be illustrated by Leibniz's justiªcation of the last step in the following calculation:
The last step in the calculation (2.2), namely udv ϩ vdu ϩ du dv ϭ udv ϩ vdu is an application of Leibniz's TLH. In his 1701 text Cum Prodiisset (1846, pp. 46-47), Leibniz presents an alternative justiªcation of the product rule (see Bos 1974, p. 58) . Here he divides by dx and argues with differential quotients rather than differentials. The role played by the TLH in this calculation is similar to that played by adequality in Fermat's work on maxima and minima.
Clear Concepts?
Was Fermat working with clear concepts that were destined to become those of the calculus? This is a complex question that conºates two separate issues: (a) were Fermat's ideas clear? and (b) were Fermat's ideas destined to become those of the calculus? Even the latter formulation is questionable, as the deªnite article in front of "calculus" disregards that fact, emphasized by H. Bos (1974) , that the principles of Leibnizian calculus based on differentials differ from those of modern calculus based on functions. Thus the answer to (b) is certainly "we don't know," though there is a parallelism between adequality and TLH as we argued in Subsection 2.3. As far as question (a) is concerned, it needs to be pointed out that such concerns are as old as the critique of Fermat's method by Descartes, who precisely thought that Fermat was confused and his method in the category of a lucky guess. 11 However, most modern scholars don't share Descartes' view. Thus, H. Breger wrote: brilliant mathematicians usually are not so very confused when talking about their own central mathematical ideas [. . .] I would like to stress that my hypothesis renders Fermat's mathematics clear and intelligible, that the hypothesis is supported by several philo-
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The Method of Adequality 11. See Mahoney 1994, pp. 180-181. logical arguments, and that it does not need the assumption that Fermat was confused. (Breger 1994, pp. 193-194) For all our disagreements with Breger, this is one point we can agree upon.
Did Fermat Make a Mistake?
In interpreting Fermat's adequality, one has to keep in mind that certain crucial components of the conceptual structure of the calculus were as yet unknown to Fermat. A striking illustration of this is what Strømholm refers to as Fermat's "mistake" (Strømholm 1968, p. 51 Strømholm comments as follows concerning this division:
Fermat told his readers that one was to divide by some power of E. This, of course, was wrong as can be seen from f
Still, his mistake was understandable (Strømholm1968, p. 51). Strømholm does not explain how exactly it can be seen from the Taylor series expansion that Fermat was wrong. Strømholm continues as follows:
As he could not possibly foresee the peculiarities and future signiªcance of the f (n) (A), he guarded himself against the possibility that fЈ(A) be zero, a case which might conceivably (to him) turn up in some future problem." (1968, p. 51) In the framework of Strømholm's narrow interpretation of the method, no such case could conceivably turn up (but see below), and for a reason unrelated to any "future signiªcance of f (n) (A)." Namely, if the derivative vanishes identically (note that Fermat's calculation is a symbolic manipulation without assigning a particular value to the variable A), then the original function itself is identically constant by the fundamental theorem of calculus (FTC). The latter wasn't proved until the 1670s, by Isaac Barrow. Not being aware of the FTC, Fermat was apparently also unaware of the fact that no such future problem could turn up, and therefore left in the phrase "some power of E", even though only the ªrst power is relevant.
Have we shown then that Fermat's description of his method contains a mistake, or at least a redundancy? This is in fact not the case. Giusti (2009) notes that in the ªfth article Appendice à la Méthode du Maximum et Minimum there is an example involving radicals. In this case, the method of adequality as applied by Fermat leads to an expression in which (before division) the least power of E is 2 rather than 1, and one does have to divide by E 2 instead of by E. 13 What about the above argument based on the FTC then? What happened is that Fermat performs a series of algebraic simpliªcations so as to eliminate the radicals from the equation, a point also noted by Andersen (1983, p. 59) . The result in this case is an expression where the least power of E is 2. Such manipulations are not mentioned in the algorithmic/formal description of the method of adequality, and were not taken into account in Strømholm's description of Fermat's "mistake." This example is a striking illustration of the fact that Fermat's method of adequality is not a single method but rather a cluster of methods. The algorithmic procedure described by Fermat at the outset is merely a kernel common to all applications, but in each application the kernel is applied somewhat differently. We will analyze one such difference in the next two sections.
Comparing the First and Second Problems in Méthode
In this section, we will analyze some apparent dissimilarities between Fermat's approaches to the ªrst two problems in his Méthode pour la recherche du maximum et du minimum (1896, p. 122-123) . The ªrst problem involves splitting a segment into two subsegments so as to maximize the area of the rectangle formed by the subsegments as sides. The solution is a straightforward application of the formal algorithmic technique he outlined on the previous page (1896, p. 121). Fermat's second problem involves ªnding the equation of a tangent line to a parabola. Mathematically speaking, the second problem is equivalent to the ªrst. Namely, given a point, say P, on the parabola, we would write down the point-slope formula for a line through P (with the point ªxed and slope, variable), form the difference between the point-slope and the formula for the parabola, and look for an extremum of the resulting expression. But did Fermat view it that way? He does not appear to have described it that way. Forming the difference of the two formulas is an algebraic procedure. Did Fermat have such an algebraic procedure in mind, or would such an approach go beyond the geometric framework as it actually appears in Fermat? What Fermat did write is that the point on the tangent line lies outside the parabola. Having stated this geometric fact, Fermat proceeds to write down an inequality expressing it. Is the resulting inequality an inessential embellishment of this particular application of the method of maxima and minima, or is it an essential part of the argument? At least on the surface of it, Fermat's formulation is unlike the earlier case where one obtains an adequality immediately, due to the nature of the problem, without using an intermediate inequality.
The passage from the inequality to adequality, depending on whether it is seen as an essential ingredient in the argument, may or may not make the second example different from the ªrst one, as we discuss in Subsection 4.1.
Tangent Line and Convexity of Parabola
Consider Fermat's calculation of the tangent line to the parabola (see 1896, pp. 122-123) . To simplify Fermat's notation, we will work with the parabola y ϭ x 2 , or
To understand what Fermat is doing, it is helpful to think of the parabola as a level curve of the two-variable function x y 2 . Given a point (x,y) on the parabola, Fermat wishes to ªnd the tangent line through the point. Fermat exploits the geometric fact that by convexity, a point (p,q) on the tangent line lies outside the parabola. He therefore obtains an inequality equivalent in our notation to p q 2 1 > , or p 2 Ͼ q. Here q ϭ y Ϫ e, and e is Fermat's magic symbol we wish to understand. Thus, we obtain where r is the distance from the vertex of the parabola to the point of intersection of the tangent to the parabola at y with the axis of symmetry, (v) he cross multiplies and cancels identical terms on right and left, then divides out by e, discards the remaining terms containing e, and obtains the solution y ϭ r. 14 What interests us here are the steps (i) and (ii). How does Fermat pass from an inequality to an adequality? Giusti already noted that Comme d'habitude, Fermat est autant détaillé dans les exemples qu'il est réticent dans les explications. On ne trouvera donc presque jamais des justiªcations de sa règle des tangentes. (Giusti 2009) In fact, Fermat provides no explicit explanation for this step. However, he uses the same principle of applying the deªning relation for a curve to points on the tangent line to the curve. Note that here the quantity e, as in q ϭ y Ϫ e, is positive: Fermat did not have the facility we do of assigning negative values to variables. Thus, Strømholm notes that Fermat never considered negative roots, and if A ϭ 0 was a solution of an equation, he did not mention it as it was nearly always geometrically uninteresting. (Strømholm 1968, p. 49) Fermat says nothing about considering points y ϩ e "on the other side", i.e. further away from the vertex of the parabola, as he does in the context of applying a related but different method, for instance in his two letters to Mersenne (see Strømholm 1968, p. 51) , and in his letter to Brûlart (Fermat 1643) . 15 Now for positive values of e, Fermat's inequality (4.1) would be satisªed by a transverse ray (i.e., secant ray) starting at (x,y) and lying outside the parabola, just as much as it is satisªed by a tangent ray starting at (x,y). Fermat's method therefore presupposes an additional piece of information, privileging the tangent ray over transverse rays.
298
The Method of Adequality 14. In Fermat's notation y ϭ d, y ϩ r ϭ a.
Step (v) can be understood as requiring the expression 
Two Interpretations of the Geometric Ingredient
What is the nature of the additional piece of information that would privilege the tangent ray? There are two possible approaches here:
• one can argue that the additional piece of information is derived from the geometric context: namely, the tangent line provides a better approximation than a transverse line, motivating the passage to an adequality.
• one can argue that both Fermat's geometric context (tangent line being outside the parabola) and his inequality (p 2 Ͼ q) are merely incidental, and that Fermat's procedure here is purely algebraic, namely, equivalent to forming the difference between the formula for a line through (x,y) and the formula for the parabola, and seeking an extremum as before.
In support of the geometric interpretation, it could be said that, in order to understand Fermat's procedure, other than treating it as a magician's rabbit out of a hat, we need to relate to the geometric context. To passage from inequality to adequality therefore only becomes intelligible as something less mysterious, if one assumes that e is small and exploits the geometric background with a better rate of approximation provided by the tangent line as compared to a transverse ray. Strømholm (1968) similarly emphasizes the role of the smallness of e in Fermat's thinking. To assert that Fermat's procedure using the symbol e is purely formal/algebraic in the context of this particular example, is to assert that Fermat is a magician, not a mathematician. In support of the algebraic interpretation, it could be said that Fermat writes "adégalons donc, d'après la méthode précédente" with reference to the second example, apparently implying that the methods of the ªrst and second examples are comparable. Since both methods contain a common kernel as we discussed in Section 3, the reference to the previous example is not conclusive. Treating the geometric ingredient as an essential part of the proof in this case is the more appealing option, suggesting that the method of tangents is not a direct application of the kernel of the method of maxima and minima, but rather exploits additional geometric information in a crucial way. Similarly, K. Pedersen comments:
The inequality IO Ͼ IP holds for all curves concave with respect to the axis, and the inequality IO Ͻ IP for convex curves. For curves without points of inºection it is possible from these inequalities to ªnd a magnitude depending on a Ϫ e and x Ϫ e which has an extreme value for x Ϫ e ϭ x. (Pedersen 16 1980, p. 28 )
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16. This is the same author as Andersen 1983.
She continues:
Neither in his Methodus nor in Fermat's later writings, however, is there any indication that this was the way he related his method of tangents to his method of maxima and minima (idem) and concludes that
Descartes was right after all in raising the objection that the method of tangents was not a direct application of the method of maxima and minima. (idem)
We saw that the geometric content of the argument dealing with tangents to parabolas tends to go counter to the formal/algebraic interpretation. K. Barner (2011, p. 34) attempts to save the day by declaring that Fermat made a mistake. According to Barner, the point we denoted (p,q) in Section 4.1 should not be outside the parabola at all, but rather should be on the parabola. The line passing through (p,q) should not be the tangent line, but rather a transverse line, whereas e is the difference in the ordinates of the two points on the parabola. In this way, the inequality should not be there in the ªrst place, but should rather be an equality.
In fact, what Barner describes with uncanny accuracy is the method of Beaugrand, probably dating from 1638, as analyzed by Strømholm (1968, pp. 64-65) . We therefore ªnd Barner's explanation, as applied to Fermat, to be forced (see Section 5.3 for more details). The formal/algebraic interpretation of adequality is unconvincing in this particular case.
Fermat's Treatment of the Cycloid
The cycloid is generated by marking a point on a circle and tracing the path of the point as the circle rolls along a horizontal straight line. If the marked point is the initial point of contact of the circle with the line, and the circle rolls to the right, then the ordinate 17 of the marked point is given by the difference of the length of arc traversed (the distance the center of the circle has moved) and the distance of the point from the vertical line through the center of the circle 18 . axis of symmetry of the cycloid generated by one full revolution of the circle. If M is the point of intersection of ഞ with the generating circle when centered on the axis of symmetry, and C is the apex of that circle then in the words of Fermat: La propriété spéciªque de la courbe est que la droite RD est égale à la somme de l'arc de cercle CM et de l'ordonnée DM. 19 (1896, 144) Let r be the tangent line to the cycloid at R, and m the tangent line to the circle at M. To determine the deªning relation of r, Fermat considers the horizontal line NIV OE passing through a point N ∈ r. Here I is the ªrst point of intersection with the cycloid, while V is the point of intersection with m, and O is the point of intersection with the generating circle, and E is the point of intersection with the axis of symmetry.
Fermat's Description
The deªning relation for r is derived from the deªning relation for
Perspectives on Science 301
19. To compare Fermat's description with the parametric description given in the previous footnote, we note that length of the segment RD is Ϫ x ϭ Ϫ ϩ sin , while
Ϫ is the length of the arc CM, and the length DM equals sin . The procedure can be summarized in modern terms by the following principle:
Principle 5.1. The tangent line to the curve is deªned by using adequality to linearize the deªning relation of the curve, or "adégaler (à cause de la proprété spéciªque de la courbe qui est à considérer sur la tangente)."
Fermat uses the same argument in his calculation of the tangents to other transcendental curves whose deªning property is similar to the cycloids and involves arc length along a generating curve. For a discussion of some of these examples, see Giusti 2009 and Itard 1949 .
Breger's Interpretation
Breger claims that Fermat does not make use of an approximate equality between arc length of the circle and a segment of the tangent. The latter interpretation usually is made, but it plainly contradicts the text: Fermat explicitly calls the straight line DE "recta utcumque assumpta" (Fermat 1891, p. 163) [droite arbitraire], that is, DE is not inªnitely small or "very small." (1994, p. 206) Is it convincing to argue, as Breger does, that the hypothesis of smallness plays no role here? It is certainly true that the axis of symmetry contains points arbitrarily far from the ªxed point D. However, being able meaningfully to apply the deªning relation for the curve to the tangent line, is contingent upon the fact that for points near the point of tangency the tangent line gives a good (second order) approximation to the curve. Why does Fermat's calculation give the tangent to the cycloid? In modern terms, this is because of the quadratic order in e for the error term which results from making each of the following two substitutions: (1) substituting the point N on the tangent line for the point I on the cycloid and (2) substituting the length of a segment of the tangent to the circle for arc CO on the circle. Breger's analysis of the example proceeds as follows: Fermat (1891, p. 163) (Breger 1994, p. 206) Note that Breger suppresses the term e ϭ DE by setting it equal to zero (in discussing the expression NE Ϫ UE Ϫ CM ϩ MU) at stage 3, namely prior to division by e, 22 and with this concludes his argument in favor of a "minimum" interpretation. Such a procedure is however meaningless and certainly cannot be attributed to Fermat. Fermat clearly states:
Divisons par e; comme il ne reste ici aucun terme superºu, il n'y a pas d'autre suppression à faire. (Fermat 1896, p. 145) Fermat thus asserts that there are no terms to be suppressed after division by e in the example of the cycloid. Breger's erroneous suppression of DE prior to division by e is not accidental, but rather stems from a desire to force a "minimum" interpretation on Fermat. Breger concludes his discussion of the cycloid by pointing out that It is hard for the modern reader to get rid of the limit ideas in his mind, and so he considers the replacement of a very small arc length of the circle by a very small segment of the tangent to be quite natural. But this is not the way of Fermat. (Breger 1994, p. 206 [emphasis added]) Granted, modern "limit ideas" as applied to Fermat are a tell-tale sign of Whiggish history discussed in Section 2. However, setting e equal to zero prior to division by e is hardly "the way of Fermat", either. To conclude, Fermat's treatment of the cycloid and other transcendental curves cannot be accounted for by means of a formal/algebraic reading, and requires an element of approximation for a convincing interpretation.
Who Erred: Fermat or Barner?
In a recent article, K. Barner (2011) 
Bachet's Semantic Calque
The choice of the Latin verb adaequo in Bachet's translation of Diophantus is explained in Bachet's notes as follows:
Since in questions of this kind, Diophantus nearly 23 equates the sides of the squares 24 that are being sought, to some side, but he does not properly equate them, he calls this comparison â and not Ë â . We too call it not equality but adequality, just as we also translate © as adequal. 25 Here Bachet clearly differentiates the meanings of aequo and adaequo: the former is "equal," the latter "nearly equal" 26 . Notice that what Bachet performs here is a semantic calque: the Greek para and isoo are individually translated to ad and aequo, and recombined to produce adaequo. Bachet does not have the Latin meaning of adaequo in mind, but rather a new meaning derived from his understanding of the term coined by Diophantus. 
Breger On Mysteries of Adaequare
In 1994, Breger sought to challenge what he called the "common dogma" to the effect that Fermat uses "adaequare" in the sense of "to be approximately equal" or "to be pseudo-equal" or "to be counterfactually equal." (1994, p. 194 [em- phasis in the original])
After some introductory remarks related to the dating and editing of various manuscripts, he continues Having made these introductory remarks I want to put forward my hypothesis: Fermat used the word "adaequare" in the sense of "to put equal." (1994, p. 197) In this section, we compare Breger's interpretation and that of the viewpoint of Strømholm and Giusti that there are (at least) two different approaches in Fermat. One is based on the insight from Pappus, and involves a symmetric relation between two equal values near an extremum. The other is based on the insight from Diophantus and the method of â , which exploits an approximation. In the ªrst approach, "adequality" has an operational meaning of "setting equal" as Breger contends. However, in the second approach (see Section 5), as well as in the application of the method to tangents (see Section 4), the element of approximation is essential.
7.1. The Philology of â Breger presents several arguments in defense of his hypothesis. The ªrst two arguments are based on dictionary deªnitions, ªrst of the Latin adaequare and second of the original Greek term â . Both of these arguments are ºawed. Breger questions why Fermat would choose to employ the term adaequare in a sense different from that given in standard Latin dictionaries:
There are well established Latin words to indicate an approximate equality, namely "approximare" or, more frequently used in classical Latin as well as in the 17th century, "appropinquare". It is well known that Fermat's knowledge of Latin and Greek was excellent, and so if he wanted to tell us that there was an approximate equality, why should he use a word indicating an equality? As far as I know, this question has not been answered nor even discussed by any adherent of the dogma of Fermat interpretation. (Breger 1994, p. 198) The ªrst point is that there was no pre-existing word meaning "to set two things approximately equal." Non-mathematical texts do not talk that way; when Polybius says, for example, that Rome and Carthage were © in their power (Polyb. 1.13.8), nobody takes him to be stating a mathematical equivalence. And the words that Breger suggests, approximare or appropinquare, do not mean what Fermat wants to do: he does not want to "approximate" f (a), but rather to compare two expressions, f (a) and f (a ϩ e) . If what he wanted to do was to treat them as being approximately equal, neither the Romans nor the mathematicians of Fermat's time had a term available for that; and since the Latin preªx adcommonly translated the Greek preªx par(a)-, the term adaequalitas would be the obvious equivalent for â . To give an example of a
Greek par transformed into a Latin ad, note that the rhetorical ªgure that the Greeks called paronomasia ( É ), whereby a speaker makes a pun on two similar but not identical words, was called in Latin adnominatio. But as far as Fermat is concerned, the obvious reason that he used adaequalitas is that that was the term that Bachet used to translate the Greek â . Moreover, Fermat himself explicitly refers to the Greek term. The fact that Breger is aware of this problem is evident when he writes: Therefore Xylander and Bachet were right in using the word "adaequalitas" in their translations of Diophantus [. . .] although that does not imply that they had understood the mathematics of the passage. (Breger 1994, p. 200) To argue his hypothesis, Breger is led to postulate that Xylander and Bachet misunderstood Diophantus! Breger appears to acknowledge implicitly that Bachet's intention was to engineer a semantic calque (see Section 6), but argues that Bachet's calque was a vain exercise, to the extent that adaequo already has the meaning of parisoo, albeit not the meaning Bachet had in mind.
Greek Dictionary
Breger's "argument [that] is just based on the Greek dictionary" (1994, p. 199 ) is misconceived. The Parisian Thesaurus Graecae Linguae of 1831-75 27 on which Breger bases himself, was a reissue of Henricus Stephanus' dictionary of the same name (1572). The latter, a work of stupendous scholarship, was published in 1572, three years before Xylander's original edition of Diophantus. Neither Stephanus' Thesaurus, nor the cheaper and hence much more widely available pirated abridgement of it by aequalis, uel compar: "equal or similar" (with the note that the writers on rhetoric used the expression to mean prope aequatum, "made nearly equal") and other words formed from © and Ñ .
In the nineteenth-century Paris reissue, the term â was added by Karl Wilhelm Dinsdorf, one of the editors, who cited Diophantus and translated "AEqualitas." The Paris Stephanus, however, is not today "the best Greek dictionary," contrary to Breger's claim. The most (and in fact, for the time being, the only) authoritative dictionary today is Liddell-Scott-Jones, which deªnes â as "approximation to a limit, Dioph.
5.17." But in fact all
Greek and Latin dictionaries (with the exception of the original Stephanus, which was chieºy the result of Stephanus' own scholarship and that of Guillaume Budé) are secondary sources, recording the meanings that others have given to the words; so both Dindorf and Liddell-Scott-Jones were simply recording the translations then current for Diophantus' use of â . Both "equality" and "near equality" are possible meanings for â ; and it is up to the editors and critics of Diophantus to tell the lexicographers which meaning he intended, not the other way around.
Fermat is very unlikely to have used either the hugely expensive and rare Stephanus or the easily available Scapula, when Bachet had printed Diophantus with a facing Latin translation; and his care in saying that he is using the term adaequentur ut loquitur Diophantus, "as Diophantus says," seems to make it clear that he is speciªcally not using the Latin term in its usual meaning of "be set equal," but, rather, in a meaning peculiar to Diophantus. That meaning, as we argue in Section 8, can only be "be set approximately equal," as it was correctly understood by Bachet.
The Mathematics of
In this section we will analyze the problems in which Diophantus introduces the term â . 28. The numbering is the same in Wertheim's German translation. However, in Ver Eecke's French translation, the corresponding problems are 9, 11, and 14, which is the numbering referred to by Weil. Diophanti Alexandrini, Arithmeticorum Liber V. Here the left column is the Greek original, while the right column is the Latin translation. The term © is the ªrst word on line 8 in the left column. In the right column, line 13, we ªnd its Latin translation adaequalem. In more detail, lines 5-8 in the Greek original contain the following phrase containing © :
Latin translation: 29
Oportet igitur dividere 10 in tres quadratos, ut uniuscuiusque quadrati latus sit adaequale unitatibus 11 6 . English translation:
So we have to divide ten into three squares, so that the side of each square is adequal to 11 6 units.
Lines 14-16 in Diophantus
Lines 14-16 in the Greek original contain the following phrase containing © :
Latin translation:
Oportet igitur horum cuiusvis lateri adaequalem facere 11 6 . English translation:
So the side of each of these we have to make adequal to 11 6 .
Lines 20-21 in Diophantus
Lines 20-21 in the original Greek:
Latin:
Oportet itaque unumquodque latus adaequare ipsi 55.
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English:
So each side we have to make adequal to 55.
Line 25 in Diophantus.
Line 25: Greek:
haec aequantur 10.
English:
These equal 10 units.
8.6. ©
As Approximate Equality
Diophantus wishes to represent the number 10 as a sum of three squares. The solution he eventually ªnds is denoted ( , , ) by Ver Eecke (1926, p. 205) . In this notation, Diophantus seeks , , each of which is as close as possible ( © ) to the fraction 11 6 . The solution eventually found is α = 1321 711 , b= 1288 711 , = 1285 711 .
Thus, Diophantus speciªcally uses the term © to describe the way in which the numbers 1321 711 , 1288 711 , and 1285 711 approximate the fraction 11 6 . Interpreting Diophantus' â as anything other than "approximate equality" is therefore purely whimsical. In the next subsection we describe the method of Diophantus in more detail.
The Method of Diophantus
The following description of the method which Diophantus called â is based on the notes of Ver Eecke (1926), Wertheim (1890) , and the paper of Bachmakova (1966) . Diophantus does not have a theory of equations, but gives an algorithm for solving a class of problems by solving a particular example. We will explain his method in terms of equations for the reader's convenience. In all three examples involving â , the problem is to express a certain number as the sum of two or three rational squares, with a further inequality constraining the individual values.
In problem 12, one seeks two rational squares whose sum is 13 and each one is greater than 6. In problem 14, one seeks three rational squares whose sum is 10 and such that each one is greater than 3. In problem 17, one seeks two rational squares whose sum is 17 and such that each one is less than 10.
In all three cases, the ªrst step is to ªnd a rational square approximately equal to either one half or one third of the desired sum, depending on whether two or three numbers are sought. In addition, Diophantus uses the existence of a preliminary partial solution involving two or three rational squares giving the desired sum, N, but failing to satisfy the required inequalities. Call these numbers a i and denote the rational square close to one half or one third of the desired sum by b. He then expresses b as a sum b ϭ a i ϩ c i and considers an equation of the form ⌺(a i ϩ tc i ) 2 ϭ N ϭ ⌺a i 2 Canceling equal terms on the two sides and dividing by t gives a linear equation for t with a rational solution t 0 . Since t ϭ 1 is nearly a solution, the exact solution t 0 is close to 1 and deªnes the numbers a i ϩ t 0 c i satisfying the required inequality. As mentioned in Subsection 8.1, Diophantus' © refers to the approximate equality of each of the a i ϩ t 0 c i to the original fraction b. Ver Eecke explains the matter as follows in a footnote: â « Ô, c'est-à-dire "la voie de la quasi-égalité" ou d'approximation vers une limite; méthode dont l'objet est de résoudre des problèmes tels que celui de trouver 2 ou 3 nombres carrés, dont la somme est un nombre donné, et qui sont respectivement au plus rapprochés d'un même nombre (Ver Eecke 1926, p. 203, n. 2) .
The method, as explained here, is remarkably similar to Fermat's. It starts with a near equality and deªnes a quadratic equation which is solved as an exact equality. The method of â might be called "the method of nearby values" (see Subsection 1.2). G. Lachaud (1988) similarly speaks of â as involving approximation.
Breger on Diophantus

Breger acknowledges that
At the ªrst step-and this is the relevant step characterizing the method of â -he ªnds a positive rational z with the property 2z 2 ≈ 2a ϩ 1. (1994, p. 200) After discussing the Diophantine problems, Breger claims that the approximate equality which in fact occurs in Diophantus's Arithmetic is only due to the fact that Diophantus seeks rational solutions. (1994, p. 202) Breger's claim that Diophantus is seeking an approximate rational solution is in error. In fact, Diophantus starts from an approximate rational solution, to derive an equation for an exact rational solution. The issue of approximation is not related to the distinction rational/irrational since irrational solutions were outside the scope of Diophantus's conceptual framework. Breger further remarks that
[i]t is strongly misleading to mix Fermat's notation with our own and to describe his method in these cases by something like "f (A) adaequatur f (A Ϫ E)", as is often done. (1994, p. 204) How is one to interpret Breger's comment? The fact is that setting the former expression adequal to the latter is precisely what Fermat does in the very ªrst example, using a ϩ e rather than a Ϫ e. In the French translation which uses modern notation (in place of Fermat's original notation à la Viète for the mathematical expressions), the phrase appears in the following form:
Soit maintenant a ϩ e le premier segment de b, le second sera b Ϫ a Ϫ e, et le produit des segments: ba Ϫ a 2 ϩ be Ϫ 2ae Ϫ e 2 ; Il doit être adégalé au précédent: ba Ϫ a 2 . (Fermat 1896, p. 122) In the original Latin version, the last two lines above read as follows: At ªrst Fermat applies the method only to polynomials, in which case it is of course purely algebraic; later he extends it to increasingly general problems, including the cycloid. (Weil 1973 (Weil , p. 1146 In Section 5 we argued that transcendental curves such as the cycloid necessarily require an element of approximation.
The Diophantus-Fermat Connection
The mathematical areas Diophantus and Fermat were working in were completely different. It was arithmetic and number theory in the case of Diophantus, and geometry and calculus in the case of Fermat. Such a situation creates a fundamental problem: if one rejects the "approximation" thread connecting Diophantus to Fermat, why exactly did Fermat bring Diophantus and his terminology into the picture when working on problems of maxima and minima? Breger's solution to the problem is to declare that Diophantus was talking about minima and Fermat was also talking about minima. What kind of minima was Diophantus talking about? Breger's answer is that Diophantus' minimum is . . . 0. Namely, |x 2 Ϫ y 2 | is always bigger than zero, but gets arbitrarily close to it:
The minimum evidently is achieved by putting x equal to y, and that is why the method received its name "method of â or putting equal". As there is a minimum idea in the Diophantus passage, Fermat's reference to Diophantus becomes intelligible. (Breger 1994, p. 201) Does Fermat's reference to Diophantus become intelligible by means of the observation that |x 2 Ϫ y 2 | gets arbitrarily close to 0? According to Breger's hypothesis, Diophantus was apparently led to introduce a new term, â , to convey the fact that every positive number is greater than zero. To elaborate on Breger's hypothesis, zero is the inªmum of all positive numbers, which is presumably close enough to the idea of a minimum. All this is supposed to explain the connection to Fermat's method of minima. There are at least two problems with such a reading of Diophantus. First, did Diophantus have the number zero? Second, the condition that Diophantus imposes is merely the bound |x 2 Ϫ y 2 | Ͻ 1 (8.1) rather than any stronger condition requiring the expression |x 2 Ϫ y 2 | to be arbitrarily close to zero. Thus, Diophantus was not concerned with the inªmum of |x 2 Ϫ y 2 |. If one drops the approximation issue following Breger, the entire Diophantus-Fermat connection collapses.
Refraction, Adequality, and Snell's Law
In addition to purely mathematical applications, Fermat applied his adequality in the context of the study of refraction of light, so as to obtain Snell's law. Thus, in his Analyse pour les réfractions, Fermat sets up the formulas for the length of two segments , . = + − = + + 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 representing the two parts of the trajectory of light across a boundary between two regions of different density, and then writes:
La somme de ces deux radicaux doit être adégalée, d'après les règles de l'art, a la somme mn ϩ bn. (Fermat 1896, p. 150 [emphasis added])
Fermat explains the physical underpinnings of this application of adequality in his Synthèse pour les réfractions, where he writes that light travels slower in a denser medium (Fermat [18, p. 151] and goes on to emphasize that this is contrary to the traditional assumption that "la nature opère toujours par les lignes les plus courtes." Rather, the path chosen is the one traversed "dans le temps le plus court" (p. 152). This is Fermat's principle of least time in optics. Its implicit use by Fermat in his Analyse pour les réfractions in conjunction with adequality, is signiªcant. Namely, this physical application of adequality goes against the grain of the formal/algebraic approach. The latter focuses on the higher multiplicity of the root of the polynomial f (a ϩ e) Ϫ f (a) at an extremum a, where the extremum can be determined by an algebraic procedure without ever assigning any speciªc value to e, and obviating the need to speak of the nature of e. In this method, denoted M2 by Strømholm, the symbol e could be a formal variable, neither small or large, in fact without any relation to a speciªc number system. However, when we apply a mathematical method in physics, as in the case of the refraction principle provided by Snell's law, mathematical idealisations of physical magnitudes are necessarily numbers. The principle is that the light chooses a trajectory 0 which minimizes travel time from point A to point B. To study the principle mathematically is to commit oneself to comparing such a trajectory to other trajectories s in a family parametrized by a numerical parameter s. Here we need not assume an identity of the line in physical space with a number line (the hypothesis of such an identiªcation is called Cantor's axiom in the literature); rather, we merely point out that a number line is invariably what is used in mathematical idealizations of physical processes. In studying such a physical phenomenon, even before discussing the size of e (small, inªnitesimal, or otherwise), one necessarily commits oneself to a number system rather than treating e as a formal variable. Fermat's application of adequality to derive Snell's law provides evidence against a strict formal/algebraic interpretation of adequality.
Applications to physical problems necessarily involve a mathematical implementation based on numbers. Classical physics was done with numbers, not algebraic manipulations. One can't model phenomena in classical physics by means of formal variables.
Certainly when a physicist performs mathematical operations, he does exactly the same thing as a mathematician does. However, modeling physical phenomena by using mathematical idealization is a stage that precedes mathematical manipulation itself. In such modeling, physical phenomena get numerical counterparts, and therefore necessarily refer to a number system rather than formal variables. Pedersen & Pedersen interpret Fermat's deduction of the sine law of refraction as an early example of the calculus of variations rather than as an ordinary application of Fermat's method of maxima and minima. (Pedersen 1971) and speculate that Fermat thus anticipated Jacob Bernoulli who is generally credited with inventing the method of the calculus of variations in 1696. Arguably, at least some of the manifestations of the method of adequality amount to variational techniques exploiting a small or inªnitesimal variation e.
Conclusion
Should Fermat's e be interpreted as a formal variable, or should it be interpreted as a member of an Archimedean continuum "tending" to zero? Or perhaps should adequality be interpreted in terms of a Bernoullian continuum 30 , with e inªnitesimal? Note that the term "inªnitesimal" was not introduced until around 1670 31 , so Fermat could not have used it. Yet inªnitely small quantities were in routine use at the time, by scholars like John Wallis who was in close contact with Fermat.
While discussions of "process" are rare in Fermat when he deals with his e, we mentioned an instance of such use in Subsection 1.4. 32 Writes Strømholm:
It will not do here to drag forth the time-honoured "limiting process" of historians of mathematics [. . .] Fermat was still thinking in terms of equations; I agree that he stood on the verge of a period where mathematicians came to accept that sort of process, but he himself was in this particular case rather the last of the ancients than the ªrst of the moderns. (Strømholm 1968, p. 67) In the absence of inªnitesimals, there is no possibility of interpreting smallness other than by means of a process of tending to zero. But, as Strømholm conªrms, such a discussion is uncharacteristic of Fermat, even at the application stage, when he applies his method in concrete instances. Therefore the inªnitesimal interpretation (3) is more plausible than the kinetic interpretation (2) (see Section 1).
To return to the question posed in Section 1, as to which of the three approaches is closest to Fermat's thinking, it could be that the answer to the riddle is . . . it depends. When Fermat presents his deªnitional characterisation of adequality, as on the ªrst page of his Méthode pour la recherche du maximum et du minimum, his algorithmic presentation has a strong formal/algebraic ºavor. However, at the application stage, both in geometry and physics, ideas of approximation or smallness become indispensable. Breger (1994, pp. 205-206) claims that adequality cannot be interpreted as approximate equality. Breger's argument is based on his contention that the Latin term adaequare was not used in the sense of approximate equality by Fermat's contemporaries. However, the source of adequality is in the Greek â (parisotes), rather than the Latin adaequare, a fact that undermines Breger's argument. The question that should be asked is not whether Fermat's contemporaries used the term adaequare, but rather whether they used the inªnitely small. The latter were certainly in routine use at the time, by some of the greatest of Fermat's contemporaries such as Kepler and Wallis.
In addition to the 3-way division: formal, kinetic, and inªnitesimal, there is a distinction between (A) Fermat's deªnition, i.e., synopsis of the method as it appears in Fermat (1896, p. 121) ; and (B) what he actually does when he applies his method.
Fermat's deªnition (A) does have the air of a kind of a formal algebraic manipulation. A formal interpretation of adequality is certainly mathematically coherent, regardless of what Fermat meant by it, since one can deªne differentiation even over a ªnite ªeld. The fact itself of being able to give a purely algebraic account of this mathematical technique is not surprising. What is dubious is the claim that at the application stage (B), he is similarly applying an algebraic procedure, rather than thinking of e geometrically as vanishing, tending to zero, inªnitesimal, etc.
In light of the positivity of Fermat's e in the calculation of the tangent line, the formal story would have difªculty accounting for the passage from inequality to adequality, since the inequality is satisªed for transverse rays as well as the tangent ray. To make sense of what is going on at stage (B), we have to appeal to geometry, to negligible, vanishing, or inªnitesimal quantities, or their rate or order.
Breger's insistence on the formal interpretation (1), when applied to the application stage (B), is therefore not convincing. Fermat may have presented a polished-up algebraic presentation of his method at stage (A) that not even Descartes can ªnd holes in, but he gave it away at stage (B).
Kleiner and Movshovitz-Hadar note that Fermat's method was severely criticized by some of his contemporaries. They objected to his introduction and subsequent suppression of the mysterious e. Dividing by e meant regarding it as not zero. Discarding e implied treating it as zero. This is inadmissible, they rightly claimed. In a somewhat different context, but with equal justiªcation, Bishop Berkeley in the 18th century would refer to such e's as "the ghosts of departed quantities." (1994, p. 970 [emphasis added])
Kleiner and Movshovitz-Hadar feel that Fermat's suppression of e implies treating e as zero, and that the criticisms by his contemporaries and by Berkeley were justiªed. However, P. Strømholm already pointed out in 1968 that in Fermat's main method of adequality (M1):
there was never [. . .] any question of the variation E being put equal to zero. The words Fermat used to express the process of suppressing terms containing E was "elido, " "deleo," and "expunge," and in French "i'efface" and "i'ôte." We can hardly believe that a sane man wishing to express his meaning and searching for words, would constantly hit upon such tortuous ways of imparting the simple fact that the terms vanished because E was zero. (Strømholm 1968, p 
Fermat did not have the notion of the derivative. Yet, by insisting that e is being discarded rather than set equal to zero, he planted the seeds of the solution of the paradox of the inªnitesimal quotient and its disappearing dx, a century before George Berkeley ever lifted up his pen to write The Analyst. 33 After summarizing Nieuwentijt's position on inªnitesimals, Leibniz wrote in 1695:
It follows that since in the equations for investigating tangents, maxima and minima (which the esteemed author [i.e., Nieuwentijt] attributes to Barrow, although if I am not mistaken Fermat used them ªrst) there remain inªnitely small quantities, their squares or rectangles are eliminated. (Leibniz [1695] (1858), p. 321)
